Hedonic Utility, Loss Aversion and Moral Hazard
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper reviews recent advances in the modelling of hedonic utility and the measurement of its physiological correlates. The paper also argues that incorporating hedonic experiences can enrich economic models. An example of such an application — a principal–agent model with moral hazard — is presented and thoroughly analyzed. Its implications are then compared with the structure of incentive contracts observed in practice. Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0700000041
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics
دوره 5 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010