The Swing Voter’s Curse: Comment
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Swing Voter’s Curse in the Laboratory
This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter’s curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on “pivotal voter” models. Our experiment controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the distribution of preferences and other theoretically relevant parameters. The design varies the share of partisan ...
متن کاملThe Swing Voter’s Curse in the Laboratory1
This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter’s curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on "pivotal voter" models. Our experiment controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the distribution of preferences, and other theoretically relevant parameters. The design varies the share of partisan...
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We analyze voting behavior in a large electorate in which voters have adversarial state-contingent preferences with incomplete information about the state of the world. We show that one type of voter can suffer from the swing voter’s curse à la Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), and go on to characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of this model under different parameter values. We prove that ...
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متن کاملThe Swing Voter's Curse
We analyze two-candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters.. We demonstrate the existence of a swing voter's curse: less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless. The swing voter's curse leads to the equilibrium result that ...
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تاریخ انتشار 2002