Language is Not an Instinct

Generative Grammar came to the attention of psychologists by way of its trenchant critique of behaviorist theories of language acquisition and use, and indeed that critique played an important role in the cognitive revolution (Chomsky, 1959). But along with Generative Grammar-hiding under its coattails, so to speak-came a curious brand of nativism (Chomsky, 1968). What was most curious from the point of view of psychologists was that in arguing for his linguistic nativism, Chomsky did not rely on behavioral observations of the type conventional in the scientific study of human behavior and cognition. Instead he relied exclusively on logical arguments, most importantly his “proof” that grammars based solely on sequential associations could not account for many natural language phenomena and his argument that in principle abstract syntax could not be learned by observing particular instances of language use (argument from the poverty of the stimulus). As Generative Grammar has evolved over the years, its practitioners have begun to bolster their arguments for linguistic nativism by making reference to a variety of empirical phenomena, often extending nativistic hypotheses to aspects of language structure that were not a part of Chomsky’s original logical arguments. For example, there have been well-publicized investigations of deaf children who create their own languages, people with defective grammar genes, linguistic “savants,” children “creating” creole languages, and selective language deficits in aphasic persons. These phenomena have been described publicly in a variety of different fora, both popular and scientific. However, their popular reporting often