AN ASCENDING AUCTION FOR INDEPENDENT VALUES: UNIQUENESS AND ROBUSTNESS TO STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY BY DIRK BERGEMANN and STEPHEN MORRIS COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1207 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
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چکیده
=959444. 17P07044.indd 128 6/12/07 2:34:36 PM VOL. 97 NO. 2 129 AN ASCENDING AuCtION fOR INtERDEPENDENt VALuES The dynamic game introduces the possibility that a player can strategically commit in order to affect the behavior of the other agents. The analysis above suggests that the strategic value of the commitment does not interfere with our analysis. The absence of a strategic value of commitment is due, here, to the careful design of the monetary transfers that neutralize the strategic value of commitment.
منابع مشابه
An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty
=959444. 17P07044.indd 128 6/13/07 9:17:39 AM VOL. 97 NO. 2 129 AN ASCENDING AuCtION fOR INtERDEPENDENt VALuES The dynamic game introduces the possibility that a player can strategically commit in order to affect the behavior of the other agents. The analysis above suggests that the strategic value of the commitment does not interfere with our analysis. The absence of a strategic value of commi...
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تاریخ انتشار 2007