General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: CRRA versus CARA∗

Mean Field and N-agent Games for Optimal Investment under Relative Performance Criteria

We analyze a family of portfolio management problems under relative performance criteria, for fund managers having CARA or CRRA utilities and trading in a common time horizon in log-normal markets. We construct explicit time-independent equilibrium strategies for both the finite population games and the corresponding mean field games, which we show are unique in the class of time-independent eq...

Pattern of Trade and Economic Development in the Model of Monopolistic Competition

The paper introduces differences in production and transaction conditions between countries into the model of monopolistic competition to investigate the interplay between trade policies and development strategies. It applies inframarginal analysis, which is total benefit analysis between corner solutions in addition to marginal analysis of each corner solution, to show that as transaction cond...

General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A new approach

Testable Implications of Translation Invariance and Homotheticity: Variational, Maxmin, CARA and CRRA preferences

We describe the observable content of some of the most widely used models of decision under uncertainty: models of translation invariant preferences. In particular, we characterize the models of variational, maxmin, CARA and CRRA utilities. In each case we present a revealed preference axiom that is satisfied by a dataset if and only if the dataset is consistent with the corresponding utility r...

City size and the Henry George theorem under monopolistic competition

We analyze the equilibrium and the optimal resource allocations in a monocentric city under monopolistic competition. Unlike the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) case, where the equilibrium markups are independent of city size, we present a variable elasticity of substitution (VES) case where the equilibrium markups fall with city size. We then show that, due to excess entry triggered ...