Facilitate, don't forbid, trade between conservationists and resource harvesters.
نویسندگان
چکیده
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منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Ecological applications : a publication of the Ecological Society of America
دوره 24 1 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014