The Properly Efficient Bargaining Solutions
نویسنده
چکیده
This note is motivated by the similarity between multiobjective programming (MOP) and bargaining theory. It uses the known MOP concepts to establish two new bargaining results: (1) the efficiency of KalaiSmorodinsky (KS) and Nash (NA) solutions for large classes of bargaining problems can be refined to the sharper concept of proper efficiency; (2) the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) of NA solution in convex bargaining can be upgraded to strong IIA, which is a form of sensitivity analysis in MOP. These results show that bargaining theory and MOP can gain insights from each other.
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