Inferentialism, Logicism, Harmony, and a Counterpoint

Inferentialism is explained as an attempt to provide an account of meaning that is more sensitive (than the tradition of truth-conditional theorizing deriving from Tarski and Davidson) to what is learned when one masters meanings. The logically reformist inferentialism of Dummett and Prawitz is contrasted with the more recent quietist inferentialism of Brandom. Various other issues are highlighted for inferentialism in general, by reference to which different kinds of inferentialism can be characterized. Inferentialism for the logical operators is explained, with special reference to the Principle of Harmony. The statement of that principle in the author’s book Natural Logic is fine-tuned here in the way obviously required in order to bar an interesting would-be counterexample furnished by Crispin Wright, and to stave off any more of the same. ∗To appear in ed. Alex Miller, Essays for Crispin Wright: Logic, Language and Mathematics (in preparation for Oxford University Press: Volume 2 of a two-volume Festschrift for Crispin Wright, co-edited with Annalisa Coliva). Discussions with Tadeusz Szubka prompted a more detailed examination of Brandom’s inferentialism, and its points of contrast with Dummett’s. Thanks are owed to Salvatore Florio for an extremely careful reading of an earlier draft, which resulted in significant improvements. Robert Kraut was generous with his time and expertise on a later draft. Two referees for Oxford University Press provided helpful comments, which led to considerable expansion. The author is fully responsible for any defects that remain.