Social Welfare Function for Restricted Preference Domain
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider the social preference ordering in a society where each individual’s preference domain is restricted to a subset of the whole set of alternatives. We show that the social welfare function satisfying unrestricted domain property, independence of irrelevant alternatives and weak Pareto optimality is always dictatorial when at least one individual is entitled to express his/her preference on the whole set of alternatives.
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