Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive alignment. 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc. JEL classification: C72
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 46 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004