Random Paths to Stability in Hedonic Coalition Formation
نویسنده
چکیده
We study the myopic stability of hedonic coalition formation. Myopic stability means that for each unstable coalition structure there exists a sequence of myopic blockings that leads to a stable coalition structure. The main result is a characterization of the hedonic coalition formation models which are myopically stable whenever a stable coalition structure exists. One interesting implication of this result is that every stable hedonic coalition formation model is myopically stable. Previously known positive results about the marriage model (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990) and the roommate model (Diamantoudi, Miyagawa, and Xue, 2002) also follow.
منابع مشابه
Individual Stability in Hedonic Coalition Formation
I study the existence of Nash-stable and individually stable coalition structures in hedonic coalition formation games, where a coalition structure is a partition of the players, and players strictly rank the coalitions to which they belong. The hedonic coalition formation game in which all coalitions are feasible is viewed as a general model, and more specific models, such as the marriage and ...
متن کاملHedonic coalition formation games: A new stability notion
This paper studies hedonic coalition formation games where each player’s preferences rely only upon the members of her coalition. A new stability notion under free exit-free entrymembership rights, referred to as strong Nash stability, is introducedwhich is stronger than both core and Nash stabilities studied earlier in the literature. Strong Nash stability has an analogue in non-cooperative ga...
متن کاملFractional Hedonic Games: Individual and Group Stability
Coalition formation provides a versatile framework for analyzing cooperative behavior in multi-agent systems. In particular, hedonic coalition formation has gained considerable attention in the literature. An interesting class of hedonic games recently introduced by Aziz et al. [3] are fractional hedonic games. In these games, the utility an agent assigns to a coalition is his average valuation...
متن کاملShao-chin Sung; Dinko Dimitrov: Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games *
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. ...
متن کاملCore Stability in Hedonic Coalition Formation
In many economic, social and political situations individuals carry out activities in groups (coalitions) rather than alone and on their own. Examples range from households and sport clubs to research networks, political parties and trade unions. The underlying game theoretic framework is known as coalition formation. This survey discusses the notion of core stability in hedonic coalition forma...
متن کامل