Control of condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the constructive variant of the control problem for Condorcet voting, where control is done by deleting voters. We prove that this problem remains NP-hard for the Condorcet-consistent voting rule Uncovered Alternatives. Furthermore, we develop a relation-algebraic model of Condorcet voting and relation-algebraic specifications of the dominance relation and the solutions of the control problem.
منابع مشابه
Relation-algebraic and Tool-supported Control of Condorcet Voting
We present a relation-algebraic model of Condorcet voting and, based on it, relation-algebraic solutions of the constructive control problem via the removal of voters. We consider two winning conditions, viz. to be a Condorcet winner and to be in the (Gilles resp. upward) uncovered set. For the first condition the control problem is known to be NP-hard; for the second condition the NP-hardness ...
متن کاملHow Hard is Control in Multi-Peaked Elections: (Extended Abstract)
We study the complexity of voting control problems in multi-peaked elections. In particular, we focus on the constructive/destructive control by adding/deleting votes under Condorcet, Maximin and Copeland voting systems. We show that the NP-hardness of these problems (except for the destructive control by adding/deleting votes under Condorcet, which is polynomial-time solvable in the general ca...
متن کاملThe Random Pairs Voting Rule: Introduction and Evaluation With a Large Dataset
This paper introduces and evaluates the Random Pairs voting rule to show that it significantly improves upon the communication complexity of balloting methods requiring complete orderings of candidates while maintaining a high Condorcet efficiency. To this end, Random Pairs is compared to plurality, 2-approval, Borda, and range voting on elections constructed from Yahoo! users’ ratings of music...
متن کاملControlling elections with bounded single-peaked width
The problems of controlling an election have been shown NP-complete in general but polynomial-time solvable in single-peaked elections for many voting correspondences. To explore the complexity border, we consider these control problems by adding/deleting votes in elections with bounded single-peaked width k. Single-peaked elections have singlepeaked width k = 1. We prove that the constructive ...
متن کاملManipulation and Control Complexity of Schulze Voting
Schulze voting is a recently introduced voting system enjoying unusual popularity and a high degree of real-world use, with users including the Wikimedia foundation, several branches of the Pirate Party, and MTV. It is a Condorcet voting system that determines the winners of an election using information about paths in a graph representation of the election. We resolve the complexity of many el...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- European Journal of Operational Research
دوره 246 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014