A framework for evaluating collective action and informal institutional dynamics under a resource management policy of decentralization

a r t i c l e i n f o The decentralization of resource property rights has become an increasingly popular policy in many natural resource-dependent communities of the developing world. However, the success of this policy approach depends on both collective action and institutionalization. It is therefore important to evaluate collective action and insti-tutionalization where the process of property rights decentralization is in progress. This paper presents a modified version of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework designed to analyze the decentralization of property rights and the collective action of community members to obtain these rights. It describes a three-phased framework for analyzing: i) the government property right decentralization policy, ii) the stock of capital assets in the community required to achieve property rights by initiating collective action, and iii) the development of an informal institution for effective property right distribution in the community. Finally, to demonstrate its utility to collective action research, we present a case study application of our modified framework to the fisheries property right decentralization policy of the Bangladesh government and the subsequent collective action of a wetland-dependent community. Since the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987, community participation in natural resource management has been given more attention by researchers and policy makers (Atkinson et al., 2007, p-2). Moreover, the intellectual movement towards community ownership of resources rather than government or private ownership has driven greater community participation in resource management (Ostrom, 1997). At the same time, deep-rooted relationships between decentralization, collective action and property rights have caused many governments to recognize the important role of communities in natural resource management for achieving sustainable development and conservationrelated goals (Agrawal, 2001; Ostrom et al., 1992). In the context of decentralization , two regulatory regimes can be found to affect natural resource management: informal institutions and formal institutions. During the process of decentralization, formal institutions play the role of patron, regulating the decentralization of property rights to resource-dependent communities. On the other hand, informal institutions define the local regulatory regime, including the roles and responsibilities of resource users. Blaikie (2006) and Ribot (2004, pp. 12–13) observed that decentralization is successful only when accountability, transparency, participation and equity are established in both formal and informal institutions. Further, Kahkanon (1998) noted that the establishment of accountability, transparency, participation and equity in informal institutions enhances the collective action of a community. Ostrom (2000a, 2000b) summarized that collective …