Analytical Action Theory as a Conceptual Basis of Social Science

In 'A Theory of Social Action' (Dordrecht, 1984) Tuomela has presented the first elaborated attempt at specifying the foundations of social science in a way explicit and precise enough to meet the standards of contemporary philosophy of science. The theory is not meant to cover sociallife completely. But it is meant to cover that part which is presumed to be most genuinely human and therefore most important to us, viz. action. Starting from a precise and comprehensive definition of 'social action' Tuomela's theory claims to account for a wide range of concepts used by social scientists (including 'norm', 'role', 'group', 'organization', 'community', and 'society') and to clarify what 'explanation' in social science amounts to. The paper under discussion exhibits in a concise way the fundamental conceptual apparatus and shows how it applies to three representative examples of social action. To what extent Tuomela's foundation is empirically adequate must of course be assessed by social scientists inquiring step-by-step into its theoretical ramifications and applications. Yet his account of social life is rather formal und presents heavy reading for people other than philosophers. Hence social scientists are not likely to look at it more closely unless they are convinced that the general theoretical framework makes further study of the book worthwhile. But Tuomela's theory of social action relies on the analytical account of individual action to which he has also made important contributions.! Analytical action theory in turn, for all its modifications and refinements, is deeply rooted in traditional philosophical reflection on human acting and reasoning which differs largely in method and content from modern social science. Being myself a philosopher I am inclined to believe that this conception is sound. Although I consider a variety of details to be in need of discussion and though I am certainly dissatisfied by some explications of central concepts (e.g. the Sellarsian account of belief and intention), I am convinced that Tuomela's approach to social action is correct in essence. Realizing, however, that many sociologists are likely to be sceptical about what appears to them as 'traditional individualism' I think I should try in