Comparation in apprehensive imagination

ion in the Verstandes-Actus) but, rather, is only depicted by means of Comparation (and the other two acts of understanding). The form of nexus in the timescape of subjective time (figure 23) shows us the real context for this aspect of the Comparation property set. Referring to this and the schemata of Relation in figure 22, we can make out three topological forms of representation trajectories that Comparation must support. The first is called the modus of persistence-in-time. In the context of Comparation, this refers to everything that "fills" a particular timeline between the moments in time marked by the making of intuitions. In Critical epistemology, we say that a moment in time "grows out of" the immediately antecedent moment in time to which it is connected by a timeline. One analogy I tend to like is to envision each timeline as a kind of "pipe" through which comparand representations "flow" with the ends of the pipes aligning with the conscious moments in time. All the sensuous materia "inside the pipe" is then to be regarded as materia persistent in time. There are a couple of observations in regard to this metaphor that need to be set down. The first is that a timeline has no fixed duration. In Critical terminology, duration in the time of a thing is the measure of the magnitude of the Dasein (presence) of that thing insofar as it is a phenomenon [Kant (1783), 29: 842]. Representations "between moments in time" are not even conscious representations in relationship to intuition, much less representations of phenomena. Therefore, no idea of "duration" can be attached to the length of a graphical representation of a timeline. Timelines in subjective time are ideas of secondary quantities in the mathematical facet B of Reality-in-general. Of course, this does raise the issue of how a timeline is re-presented in a somatic embedding field graph, but this is not an especially difficult puzzle to solve. Draw a line underneath the timescape of figure 23 and call this line the somatic-objective-time timeline. This construct will stand as a principal quantity of facet B determinable, with respect to facet A, by measuring instruments ("clocks"). A moment in time is "where a pulse of consciousness takes place" and, to the extent that one can "clock" the presentation of a perception, those "clock moments" in the objective timeline can be defined as corresponding to moments in subjective time. The subjective-time timeline representations can then be "stretched or shortened" as appropriate to make their moments in time line up with those of the objective timeline. Stated in terms of the Comparation property set, Comparation requires a temporal synchronizing algorithm as part of its property set definition. The second observation is a reference to a particularly prescient conjecture Grossberg made in 1969 [Grossberg (1969); Wells (2011c)]. Grossberg observed that sensory experiences, while seeming to be spatio-temporally continuous, are also adequately describable by relatively discrete processes (e.g., by means of language). He concluded that "the discrete representation of continuous processes must be a universal representation of some kind." In our mental physics construct of "time pipes" and their context as a sensuous "persistent-insubjective-time," we find both the continuous and the discrete aspects of which Grossberg wrote. This tells us Grossberg's conjecture is objectively valid and his idea of a "pyramid of 86 Kant, Immanuel (1783), Metaphysik Mrongovius, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Band XXIX, pp. 745940, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1983. 87 For example, see Obhi, Sukhvinder S. and Patrick Haggard (2004), "Free will and free won't," American Scientist, vol. 92, no. 4, July-August, pp. 358-365. 88 Grossberg, Stephen (1969), "Embedding fields: A theory of learning with physiological implications," Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 6, 209-239. 89 Wells, Richard B. (2011c), "The applied metaphysic of the somatic code," available on the Wells Laboratory web site.