David Chadwick , Ilsun You and Hang Bae Chang ( Eds . ) The 1 st International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats

A study conducted by the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute CERT Program analyzed hundreds of insider cyber crimes across U.S. critical infrastructure sectors. Follow-up work involved detailed group modeling and analysis of 35 cases of insider theft of intellectual property. In the context of this paper, insider theft of intellectual property for business advantage includes incidents in which the insider’s primary goal is stealing confidential or proprietary information from the organization with the intent to use it to take to a new job, to get a new job, or to start a business. It does not include cases of in which insiders sell an organization’s information. This paper describes general observations about, and a system dynamics model of, this class of insider crime based on our empirical data. This work generates empirically-based hypotheses for validation and a basis for identifying mititgative measures in future work.