Complexity and bidder behavior in iterative auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
We extend the finite automata approach to evaluate complexity of strategies in iterative adjustment processes such as auctions. Intuitively, a strategy’s complexity is equal to the number of different contingencies in which qualitatively different behaviors are prescribed. Complexity may explain bidder choice of strategies in multi-unit iterative auctions. JEL classification codes: D44, C73
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تاریخ انتشار 2011