Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper, we introduce a component efficient value for TU games with a coalition structure which reflects the outside options of players within the same structural coalition. It is based on the idea that splitting a coalition should affect players who stay together in the same way. We show that for all TU games there is a coalition structure that is stable with respect to this value. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 65 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009