The Stakeholder Game: Pleadings and Reasons in Environmental Policy

A commitment to receive input from stakeholders is often obligatory in the crafting of environmental policies. This requirement is presumed to satisfy certain conditions of democracy. In this article, by drawing from pragmatism, we examine the logic of participation and prerequisites of the meaningful game of asking for and giving reasons. We elaborate the nature and significance of three components—the game, the pleadings, and the reasons. We conclude by offering the conditions under which the stakeholder game might be considered legitimate. keywords: pragmatism, policy, stakeholders, participation, reasons juha hiedanpää and daniel w. bromley 426 the necessary conditions under which participation from stakeholders represents a logically valid game of reason giving. We argue here that these necessary conditions can be quite severe. Research concerning the deliberative and discursive aspects of democracy is pertinent to environmental policy as an alternative to rationalist expert-driven approaches (Dryzek 1990). First, complexity, pluralism, and the importance of local knowledge (Berkes 2007; Connolly 2005) suggest that stakeholders can contribute essential and creative ideas to the design and evaluation of specific projects (Bäckstrand 2006a). Second, the evolution of democratic ideals requires collective input to establish the legitimacy of certain policy actions (Bäckstrand 2006b; Dryzek 2004). Third, when those who are inclined to oppose particular actions can be persuaded to reconsider their position, chances for more orderly and predictable social change improve (Innes and Booher 2010; Young 2001). Finally, corporate governance protocols, in which shareholders play an important role, have also been adopted in public policy considerations: stakeholders and shareholders can be analogical (Matten and Crane 2005; Thomas and Poister 2009). Of course, this final point highlights one of the contradictions in the stakeholder game. Shareholders in a corporation are the essence of stakeholders. Obviously, they have a financial stake in how their investment performs, and there is a direct—though often contested—connection between the actions of corporate leaders and the financial return to stakeholders in those corporations. However, this essential nexus is not present in many public projects in which the alleged benefits and costs are diffused, not well identified, and often speculative. In these more complex choice situations, the known connections that are necessary for informed argumentation are largely missing. Surprisingly, not much research exists on the logic of stakeholder involvement and participation comparing these two arenas—the public and the private. Without clear evidence of the logical imperative for stakeholder input across these two domains, public-sphere stakeholder input may well violate the very goals it is intended to achieve. That is, stakeholder input can easily lack legitimacy. Here, we explore the conditions under which “hearing from stakeholders” can be considered justified. And, by implication, we discuss the conditions under which stakeholder input is impertinent. We will address the problem of stakeholder input from three perspectives. First, we will discuss the nature of the stakeholder game itself. the stakeholder game 427 We will then turn to a discussion of the stakeholder as pleader and as reason giver. We will close with an elaboration of the necessary attributes of the reasons offered up by stakeholders. All three components—the game, the pleadings, and the reasons—must satisfy certain conditions if the input from stakeholders is to be considered valid and edifying for those officials required to conduct public hearings. Investment in a Game When official bodies, authoritative agents, engage in a dialogue with stakeholders, the process represents an affirmation of a specific routine that comprises both the strategic and the substantive aspects of democracy. Participants are invested in a game of asking for and giving reasons. The concept of investment implies that all participants consider the commitment to be worth the effort. In northern Europe and in the United States this activity is routine— perhaps even ceremonial—because it is conducted according to strict legal requirements, even though meaningful input is often lacking (Cornwall 2004). The routine dimension is found in the elaborate protocols of public noticing, registration, and solicitations addressed to all plausibly pertinent individuals to appear in person or to submit testimony. The purpose in such exercises is to inform the alleged “public” about what we shall call authoritative intentions. Obviously, if all affected individuals were to appear at a public hearing, the system would choke on the chaos. However, in terms of written comments, the more actually received, the more “successful” the stakeholder input. Often, substantive issues are overwhelmed by cascades of standardized claims of support for or opposition to proposed actions on the part of the authoritative agents. For stakeholders, participation is hardly routine or ceremonial. Unlike authoritative agents, for whom public input has an obligatory aspect, stakeholders often welcome the opportunity to engage in the realm of “rational” public policy making—they are invested in the game. For them, participation in the game has a clear and noble purpose—to express an opinion and to participate in the formation of the collective will. At the strategic level, information is indeed conveyed from stakeholders to authoritative agents and in the opposite direction. That is, authoritative agents will indicate what information is pertinent to their current deliberations, and stakeholders juha hiedanpää and daniel w. bromley 428 will submit that information—often in quite detailed form. Stakeholders will also offer information and opinions on aspects that might not have been solicited. This information may help to fine-tune the details of alternative courses of action. At a substantive level, the information from stakeholders often responds to specific requests concerning proposed actions, and committed stakeholders generally seek to provide complete and honest information explaining their views on those actions. This presumes that the conjoint action to define and design the ends-in-view would not exist without the collaborative input of stakeholders (Dewey 1927, 320–50). Often, this collaboration can define and even shape the ends-in-view (Forester 1999, 115–53). The authoritative agents often acknowledge that the particular nature of the problems in question entails that the public—or a specific subset—may have important insights concerning a particular problem and the best solutions to it. Recognizing that authoritative agents hold the trump card in terms of official status, stakeholders generally frame their presentations as requests rather than demands. However, it is necessary to understand that the claims being advanced are competitive in nature. Stakeholders are not playing a game against the authoritative agent per se. Rather, they are playing a game against other stakeholders, their interests, and their deontic powers. The purpose is always to affect—to alter—the assumptions of authoritative agents concerning the future. The purpose is also to affect the intentions, relative powers, and opportunities of other players of the game of reason giving. Depending on how stakeholder involvement and participation are arranged, hearings and collaboration redefine the space of opportunity and the conditions of organized and unorganized collective actions. To a certain extent, the voices of the public and of the authoritative agents are constructed and redefined in the course of this formal collaboration. Stakeholders are intentional agents (Anscombe 1963). The act of intending carries with it conditions that resemble those required for any credible speech act. This leads to the following proposition about the nature of the stakeholder game: