Deciding under Partial Ignorance

The Emergence of Ordered Belief from Initial Ignorance

AbStXlWt Some simple assumptions about prior ignorance, and the idea that a sticiently arresting contrast in the likelihoods of evidence will elicit belief that one proposition is at least as belief-worthy as another, lead to a partial ordering of propositions without the use of any hind of prior probability. The partial ordering is mt a posterior probability distribution, but does share some i...

Optimising and Satisscing under Partial Ignorance

In this paper, we study decision making in situations where the outcomes of the options are (in general) uncertain, without making the assumption that this uncertainty can be exactly quantiied by means of a (single) probability measure. In such situations of partial ignorance, the traditional notion of optimising by maximising expected utility is in general rather weak, and we will discuss some...

BAYESIAN DECISIONS UNDER TOTAL AND PARTIAL IGNORANCE by

Deciding the Price of Fame

Previous studies of ignorance-driven decision-making have either analyzed when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds, or else they have examined whether human behavior is consistent with an ignorance driven inference strategy (e.g., the recognition heuristic). The current study merges these research goals by examining whether – under conditions where ignorance driven infere...

Klaus Nehring a Theory of Rational Choice under Ignorance

This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice for decisionmakers with incomplete preferences due to partial ignorance, whose beliefs are representable as sets of acceptable priors. We focus on the limiting case of ‘Complete Ignorance’ which can be viewed as reduced form of the general case of partial ignorance. Rationality is conceptualized in terms of a ‘Principle of Preference-Basedne...