Action Investment Energy Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We introduce the formalism of action investment energy games where we study the trade-off between investments limited by given budgets and resource constrained (energy) behavior of the underlying system. More specifically, we consider energy games extended with costs of enabling actions and fixed budgets for each player. We ask the question whether for any Player 2 investment there exists a Player 1 investment such that Player 1 wins the resulting energy game. We study the action investment energy game for energy intervals with both upper and lower bounds, and with a lower bound only, and give a complexity results overview for the problem of deciding the winner in the game.
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تاریخ انتشار 2012