Collaboration costs and new product development performance ¬リニ

a r t i c l e i n f o This study analyzes the relationships between governance in new product development collaboration, collaboration costs, and new product development performance. Data from new technology-based firms indicate that comprehensiveness in formal contractual governance has a stronger negative association with collaboration costs than relational governance does. In addition, collaboration costs relate negatively to new product development performance. This study contributes to understanding transaction costs within collaborative arrangements and the role of relational and formal governance in these arrangements. The role of collaboration between firms in new product development is receiving increasing attention from scholars (Zhao, Cavusgil, & Cavusgil, 2014). New firms with resource constraints can access knowledge (Benavides-Espinosa & Ribeiro-Soriano, 2014) and numerous resources through collaboration. Collaboration can be beneficial for new technology-based firms, however, collaboration also poses many risks. These risks include possible loss of valuable knowledge (Parker, 2012), loss of time because of additional complexity in coordination, and potential predatory and opportunistic behavior of collaboration partners (Wallenberg & Schaffler, 2014). Although scholars widely report collaboration's benefits, few studies focus on collaboration's risks. This study addresses this research gap and focuses on understanding the risks in collaboration. In particular, the study investigates the risk of losing development time through the complexity of managing new product development collaboration. Losing time for new technology-based firms is serious because rapid development and first-mover advantages often determine product success. In such a time-pressured context, time losses can lead to collaborative development failure. Optimal governance of collaboration is essential to reap the benefits of collaboration and minimize collaboration risks (Wallenberg & Schaffler, 2014). Research on the governance of collaboration often emphasizes the value of relational governance (Leisching, Geigenmueller, & Lohmann, 2014). The singular focus on relational governance may be appropriate for long-term relationships but not for short-term relationships. Lambe, Spekman, and Hunt (2000) highlight the lack of research on the governance of short-term focused, interimistic relationships and discuss how governance may have different roles in short-term versus long-term relationships. This study addresses this gap and empirically examines the role of governance in short-term new product development collaboration. This study contributes to understanding collaboration in challenging, time-pressured environments (Zhao et al., 2014), where an asymmetry between the size of the new firm and the collaboration partner exists (Bazyar, Teimoury, Fesharaki, Moini, & Mohammadi, 2013). Following this introduction, Section 2 contains the conceptual framework and hypotheses. Section 3 …