DDL as an “Internalization” of Dynamic Belief Revision
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چکیده
In this paper we re-evaluate Segerberg’s “full DDL” (Dynamic Doxastic Logic) from the perspective of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), in its beliefrevision-friendly incarnation. We argue that a correct version of full DDL must give up the Success Postulate for dynamic revision. Next, we present (an appropriately generalized and simplified version of) full DDL, showing that it is a generalization of the so-called Topo-logic of Moss and Parikh. We construct AGM-friendly versions of full DDL, corresponding to various revising/contracting operations considered in the Belief Revision literature. We show that DDL can internalize inside one model the “external” doxastic dynamics of DEL, as well as the evidential dynamics investigated by van Benthem and Pacuit. In our Conclusions section, we compare three styles of modeling doxastic dynamics: DDL, DEL and PDL/ETL (the Propositional Dynamic Logic approach, with its Epistemic Temporal Logic variant).
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تاریخ انتشار 2012