Allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider the selection properties of a competitive bribery model in the presence of two types of asymmetry: unevenness between the competitors and unfairness in the contest rules. Only under very special conditions does the benchmark model yield allocation efficiency; in other cases, the effect on allocation efficiency of making the contest more unfair is ambiguous and parameter specific. We present conditions under which each result obtains. Our results indicate that it is socially optimal to run an unfair contest in order to redress the allocation inefficiency introduced when contestants are asymmetric. We show, however, that a selfish, income-maximizing bribee will discriminate in the opposite direction to that which society would prefer. ©2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: O17; C72
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