Prediction-Based Enforcement of Performance Contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
Grid computing platforms require automated and distributed resource allocation with controllable quality-of-service (QoS). Market-based allocation provides these features using the complementary abstractions of proportional shares and reservations. This paper analyzes a hybrid resource allocation system using both proportional shares and reservations. We also examine the use of price prediction to provide statistical QoS guarantees and to set admission control prices.
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تاریخ انتشار 2007