Strategic Tournaments
نویسنده
چکیده
A tournament is a simultaneous n-player game built on top of a symmetric two-player game G. Each player chooses one action in G and is matched to play G against each of the other n − 1 players. His score in each match is his G-payoff. The winner of the tournament is the player who achieves the highest total score (ties are broken randomly). The tournament has several interpretations as an evolutionary model, as a model of social interaction and as a model of competition between firms with procedurally rational consumers. We show that the limit of tournaments’ equilibria (as the number of players increases) is a Nash equilibrium of G but there are equilibria of G that are not such limits. With a small number of players, the equilibria reflect considerations that differ from those of the basic game. Several examples are provided in order to explore the intuition that behavior in a tournament encourages players to choose actions that are superfluous or riskier than those chosen in G. Finally, some additional tournament structures are discussed.
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تاریخ انتشار 2012