Axiomatic characterization of the Nash and Kalai Smorodinsky solutions for discrete bargaining problems

نویسندگان

Somdeb Lahiri

SOMDEB LAHIRI

چکیده

This paper addresses a problem in axiomatic bargaining, which is a natural variation of the classical models of Nash and Kalai Smorodinsky. Departure from the convexity assumption is justi ed by situations where probability mixture of pure outcomes cannot be implemented. Applications of such problems concern integer allocations of a homogeneous product between two agents, and the problem of fair allocation of indivisible objects among two agents. Mathematics Subject Classi cations (2000). 91A12, 91B14

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