On Being Morally Expendable

Inevitably, assessing the moral value of life seems to leave us stuck between a rock and a hard place. If we hold that life is intrinsically valua­ ble, that commits us to respecting plants and paramecia as ends in them­ selves and to explaining how the change from organic to inorganic is in and of itself a moral loss. That evalu­ ation seems exaggerated, and who knows how even to begin to explain the intrinsic moral superiority of the organic to the inorganic! On the other hand, if life is valuable only as a necessary condition for other, mor­ ally significant goods, such as happi­ ness or conscientious action, it follows that the taking of life is morally sig­ nificant only where it affects the amou nt of or opportu n ities for these goods. This conclusion is objection­ able because it seems to leave the individual's life morally insignificant and unprotected: as long as he will be replaced by an (at least) equally happy or conscientious individual when he is killed, it would seem to be morally indifferent whether he is allowed to continue his life or whether he is killed and replaced.