The Nature of Perception

Within the framework of a realist view of the physical world, there are two general theories of the nature of perception. The first is strong direct realism (SDR). This accepts a realist view of the physical world, and claims that our perceptual access to this world is psychologically direct. The second is the broad representative theory (BRT). This too accepts a realist view of the world, but claims that perceptual contact with physical items is always psychologically mediated, i.e. it is constituted by the combination of the subject's being in a more fundamental psychological state, which is not in itself physical-item perceptive, and certain additional facts. SDR cannot provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenal content of perception and how such content features in the securing of perceptual contact. BRT cannot explain how we can have genuine perceptual access to the physical world at all. In the face of this dilemma, the only way of providing a satisfactory account of perception is by abandoning the assumption of physical realism and adopting an idealist view of the physical world. This view can, in any case, be established as correct by independent arguments. Abstract 2: Let us provisionally assume a realist view of the physical world, which2: Let us provisionally assume a realist view of the physical world, which takes the world to be mind-independent and metaphysically fundamental. Within the framework of this assumption, there are two general theories of the nature of perception. Let us say that a subject Φ-terminally perceives a certain physical item if and only if he perceives that item, and there is no other physical item such that his perceiving of this second item mediates his perceiving of the first. Then one of the two theories endorses a realist view of the physical world, and claims that, when someone Φ-terminally perceives a physical item, his perceptual contact with that item is something psychologically fundamental. I call this ‘strong direct realism’ (SDR). The other theory also endorses a realist view of the world. But its claim is that, whenever someone perceives a physical item (and even when the perceiving of this item is Φ-terminal), his perceptual contact with it is psychologically mediated, i.e. it is constituted by the combination of his being in some more fundamental psychological state, which is not in itself physical-item perceptive, and certain additional facts that do not involve anything further about his current psychological condition. I call this the ‘broad representative theory’ (BRT). The first issue we face, then, is: which of these two theories should we accept?