Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them

Since the demise of the Sense-Datum Theory and Phenomenalism in the last century, Direct Realism in the philosophy of perception has enjoyed a resurgence of popularity. 1 Curiously, however, although there have been attempts in the literature to refute some of the arguments against Direct Realism, there has been, as of yet, no systematic treatment of all eight of the main arguments against it. 2 The aim of this paper is to fill this lacuna in the literature by discussing all eight of these arguments against Direct Realism and the argumentative strategies Direct Realists may deploy to counter them. Direct Realists hold that perception is an immediate or direct awareness of mind-independent physical objects or events in the external world; in taking this awareness to be immediate or direct, Direct Realists deny that the perception of these physical objects or events requires a prior awareness of some tertium quid (e.g., a reified appearance, sense-datum, sensum, idea, quality-instance, species) mediating between the mind and external physical objects or events. Direct Realism is thus logically incompatible with Indirect Realism and with Idealism and Phenomenalism. Indirect Realists, like Direct Realists, are realists in the sense that they take mind-independent objects or events to be objects of perception; however, unlike Direct Realists, Indirect Realists take this perception to be indirect by involving a prior awareness of some tertium quid between the mind and external objects or events.