A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
نویسندگان
چکیده
A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let LC (resp., ℘C) denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain LC , and majority rule is the only strategy-proof rule with domain ℘C .
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