Weakened Liberal Rule Respecting Others’ Consensus: An Axiomatic Characterization

نویسنده

  • Seongkyu Park
چکیده

We introduce the strong quasi-liberal rule, which is an extension of the strong liberal rule in Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) through the requirement of at least one agreement. We provide an axiomatic characterization of strong quasi-liberal rule. Similarly, we generalize the order of the rule (associated with the degree of minimum agreement requirement) to match the Consent Rules in Samet and Schmeidler (2003). The domain is extended to allow an additional proxy opinion for each individual. We show that strong quasi-liberal rule of any finite order (associated with the degree of minimum agreement requirement) converges in probability to the strong liberal rule in a specific setting.

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تاریخ انتشار 2010