A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness

Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are moving towards increasingly specific accounts of the neural basis of conscious experience. These efforts will leave some questions unanswered, but they are no less significant for that. To move beyond the hard problem, I would like to consider some real problems facing consciousness researchers. First, there is a What Problem. This is the problem of figuring out what we are conscious of. What are the contents of conscious experience? For those looking at the brain, it is closely tied to a Where Problem. Where in the brain does consciousness arise? Locating consciousness may not be enough. We need to address a How Problem. How do certain states come to be conscious? This can be construed as a version of the hard problem, by asking it with right intonation: How could certain physical states possibly be experienced? But there is another reading that is also worth investigating. The How Problem can be interpreted as asking, What are the psychological or neuronal mechanisms or processes that distinguish conscious states from unconscious states? The mechanisms and processes can be pinpointed by pursuing a closely related to a When Problem: Under what conditions do the states that are potentially conscious become conscious? Once we know what we are conscious of and when we are conscious, we can begin to address a Why Problem: Why do we have conscious states? And finally, there is a Who Problem: Who is conscious? Non-human animals? Human infants? Machines? I will discuss these problems in turn. Some already have answers, others have answers on the way, and at least one may never be answered in full. What I offer here is a progress report on a theory of consciousness that I have presented elsewhere (Prinz, 2000; 2001). I hope to show that progress is indeed being made.