Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 26 February 2008 Available online 1 December 2009 JEL classification: C62 C72 D44 D61 D82
منابع مشابه
First Price Auctions with Participation Costs∗
This paper studies equilibria of first price auctions with participation costs in the independent private values environment. We focus on the cutoff strategies in which each bidder participates and submits a bid if his value is greater than or equal to a critical value, the cutoff point. It is shown that, when bidders are homogenous, there always exists a symmetric equilibrium, and further, tha...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 69 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010