Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands

We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance of others affects individuals’ occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions. In one treatment individuals receive information about the highest tax evasion rates of Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s10797-014-9318-z) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. M. Lefebvre (B) University of Montpellier, LAMETA, Avenue Raymond Dugrand, Site Richter, 34960 Montpellier, France e-mail: [email protected] P. Pestieau University of Liège, CREPP, 7, Bd Rectorat (B31), 4000 Liège, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] P. Pestieau CORE, University of Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium P. Pestieau CEPR, London, UK P. Pestieau PSE, Paris, France A. Riedl School of Economics and Business, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands A. Riedl CESifo, Munich, Germany