Informative Voting in Large Elections∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
In the seminal paper on voting games with private information, AustenSmith and Banks (1996) derived the provocative result that informative voting is not an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the size of the electorate is large. We show that this result may depend on too strong an assumption about what voters know about the informativeness of other voters’ ballots. We add the possibility of a third type of voter, one who did not receive any evidence in favor of either of the two alternatives but who shares the preference to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent; we call this type the “no-evidence type.” If there is uncertainty about the fraction of no-evidence types and the voting population is large, then conditional on being pivotal, each of the standard Condorcet types believes that a large enough number of voters are no-evidence types and thus the incentive to vote sincerely survives. We find that even when the expected fraction of no-evidence types is arbitrarily small equilibria in which the standard Condorcet types all vote sincerely exist. JEL Classification Codes: C72
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تاریخ انتشار 2014