The Debate Over Compromise and the Goals of the Judicial Process

Talmudic literature documents a sharp debate among the tannaim regarding the legitimacy of the process of compromise or, to be more precise, of the process of bitsu‘a. This dispute appears in a well-known passage in Tosefta Sanhedrin, chapter 1, and in both Talmuds (y.Sanh. 1:1 [18b], b.Sanh. 6b), and is also mentioned briefly in Sifre Deuteronomy §17. Even upon first glance it can be seen that the debate assumes a principled character, relating to goals and values that lie at the very basis of the judicial process: truth, peace, and justice. Examination of the toseftan passage reveals that it is a well-fashioned and well-edited unit that not only presents positions but also discussion of the legal questions relating to compromise and the goal of the judicial process. However, this passage requires clarification and interpretation. First of all, concerning what kind of compromise, precisely, is there disagreement? Does it refer to every process of compromise or only to a particular kind of compromise? Second, what are the reasons underlying the controversy, and what are the different understandings of the judicial process that find expression therein? The question of the nature of compromise in the talmudic sources has been discussed by scholars on a number of occasions, but I think