How to Base Probability Theory on Perfect-Information Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
The standard way of making probability mathematical begins with measure theory. This article reviews an alternative that begins with game theory. We discuss how probabilities can be calculated game-theoretically, how probability theorems can be proven and interpreted game-theoretically, and how this approach differs from the measure-theoretic approach.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Bulletin of the EATCS
دوره 100 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010