Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Non-existence of Equilibrium in Vickrey, Second-price, and English Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
A simple example shows that equilibria can fail to exist in second price (Vickrey) and English auctions when there are both common and private components to bidders' valuations and private information is held on both dimensions. The example shows that equilibrium only exists in the extremes of pure private and pure common values, and that existence in standard models is not robust to a slight perturbation. JEL classi cation numbers: D44, C72, D41, G14
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Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Collision in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions
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