Alessandro Tavoni: Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game
نویسندگان
چکیده
Grantham Research Institute and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AZ, United Kingdom; Department of Environmental and Resource Economics, Centre for European Economic Research, 68161 Mannheim, Germany; Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats, and Institut de Ciencia i Tecnologia Ambientals, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellatera, Spain; Alfred Weber Institute for Economics, University of Heidelberg, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany; and Centre for Climate Economics and Policy, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia
منابع مشابه
Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game.
International efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality, and free-riding incentives. In an experimental setting, we distribute endowments unequally among a group of people who can reach a fixed target sum through successive money contributions, knowing that if th...
متن کاملInequality, communication and the avoidance of disastrous climate change
International efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality, and free-riding incentives. In an experimental setting, we distribute endowments unequally among a group of people who can reach a fixed target sum through successive money contributions, knowing that if th...
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Free riding and coordination difficulties are held to be the primary causes of cooperation breakdown among nonrelatives. These thwarting effects are particularly severe in the absence of effective monitoring institutions capable of sanctioning deviant behavior. Unfortunately, solutions to global environmental dilemmas, like climate change, cannot depend on coercion mechanisms, given the transna...
متن کاملAvoiding disastrous climate change is possible but not inevitable.
W hat the world does or does not do about climate change will have profound implications. If the world fails to act, we may cross a climate tipping point, with disastrous consequences all around. No country by itself can prevent this, but a substantial number of countries working together can avert disaster. Collectively, we know what we need to do. However, can we agree on what each of us shou...
متن کاملCoordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when it took the form of ambiguity, ...
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تاریخ انتشار 2011