When Do Coalitions Form a Lattice?

نویسندگان

  • Gábor Czédli
  • György Pollák
چکیده

Given a finite partially ordered set P , for subsets or, in other words, coalitions X, Y of P let X ≤ Y mean that there exists an injection φ: X → Y such that x ≤ φ(x) for all x ∈ X. The set L(P ) of all subsets of P equipped with this relation is a partially ordered set. All partially ordered sets P such that L(P ) is a lattice are determined, and this result is extended to quasiordered set P versus q-lattice L(P ) as well. Some elementary properties of distributive lattices L(P ) are also given. Dedicated to Professors László Leindler on his 60th and Károly Tandori on his 70th birthday Motivation and preliminaries In game theory or in the mathematics of human decision making the following situation is frequently considered, cf. e.g. Peleg [5]. Given a finite set P , for example we may think of P as a set of political parties, and each x ∈ P has a certain strength measured on a numerical scale that we may think of as the number of votes x receives. Subsets of P are called coalitions. The strength of a coalition is the sum of strengths of its members. Let L(P ) stand for the set of all coalitions. The relation “stronger or equally strong” is a quasiorder on P and also on L(P ). The quasiorder on P has some influence on the quasiorder on L(P ). Sometimes, like before the election in our example, all we have is a quasiorder or, more frequently, a partial order on P , supplied e.g. by a public opinion poll. Yet, as we will see, this often suffices to build some algebraic structure on L(P ). From now on, let P = 〈P,≤〉 be a fixed finite quasiordered set, i.e., ≤ is a reflexive and transitive relation on the finite set P . For x, y ∈ P , x > y means that y ≤ x and x 6≤ y. For undefined terminology the reader is referred to Grätzer [4]. Even without explicit mentioning, all sets occurring in this paper are assumed to be finite. The set of all subsets, alias coalitions, of P is denoted by L(P ). For X, Y ∈ L(P ), a map φ: X → Y is called an extensive map if φ is injective and for every x ∈ X we have x ≤ φ(x). Let X ≤ Y mean that there exists an extensive map X → Y ; this definition turns L(P ) into a quasiordered set L(P ) = 〈L(P ),≤〉. Using singleton coalitions one can easily see that P is a partially ordered set, in short a poset, iff L(P ) is a poset. Our main result, Thm. 2, describes the posets P 1991 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 06B99, Secondary 06A99, 90D99.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

The lattice of embedded subsets

In cooperative game theory, games in partition function form are real-valued function on the set of so-called embedded coalitions, that is, pairs (S, π) where S is a subset (coalition) of the set N of players, and π is a partition of N containing S. Despite the fact that many studies have been devoted to such games, surprisingly nobody clearly defined a structure (i.e., an order) on embedded co...

متن کامل

Not it: opting out of voluntary coalitions that provide a public good

Most coalitions that form to increase contributions to a public good do not require full participation by all users of the public good, and therefore create incentives for free riding. If given the opportunity to opt out of a voluntary coalition, in theory, agents should try to be among the first to do so, forcing the remaining undecided agents to bear the cost of participating in the coalition...

متن کامل

Formalizing Admissibility Criteria in Coalition Formation among Goal-directed Agents

This work studies how goal-directed agents can form profitable coalitions. A coalition is formed when some agents agree to cooperate for the achievement of a shared goal or to exchange with each other the achievement of their own goals. We define two criteria of admissibility that establish which coalitions can be formed under the assumption that agents are self-interested. The first admissibil...

متن کامل

Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining1

We study a game-theoretic model where political parties can form coalitions both before and after the elections. Before election, coalitions can commit to a seat-sharing arrangement, but not to a policy or to a division of rents from o¢ ce; coalition members are free to break up and join other coalitions after the election. Equilibrium pre-electoral coalitions are not necessarily made up of the...

متن کامل

On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods - Experimental Evidence from the Lab

The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements serve as one example. This paper experimentally tests theory on the formation of coalitions in differe...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2007