Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Martingale Restrictions on Equilibrium Prices of Arrow-debreu Securities under Rational Expectations and Consistent Beliefs

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Range Convexity and Ambiguity Averse Preferences

We show that range convexity of beliefs, a ‘technical’ condition that appears naturally in axiomatizations of preferences in a Savage-like framework, imposes some unexpected restrictions when modelling ambiguity averse preferences. That is, when it is added to a mild condition, range convexity makes the preferences collapse to subjective expected utility as soon as they satisfy structural condi...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 on Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models

Nber Working Paper Series Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study

Measurement error is ubiquitous in experimental work. It leads to imperfect statistical controls, attenuated estimated effects of elicited behaviors, and biased correlations between characteristics. We develop simple statistical techniques for dealing with experimental measurement error. These techniques are applied to data from the Caltech Cohort Study, which conducts repeated incentivized sur...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Exploiting Myopic Learning

I develop a framework in which a principal can exploit myopic social learning in a population of agents in order to implement social or selfish outcomes that would not be possible under the traditional fully-rational agent model. Learning in this framework takes a simple form of imitation, or replicator dynamics, a class of learning dynamics that often leads the population to converge to a Nash...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 General Revealed Preference Theory

We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal axiomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as preferences) are observable, then we can obtain a universal axiomatization purely on observables. The result “explains” classical revealed preference th...