A Generic Bound on Cycles in Two-Player Games
نویسنده
چکیده
We provide a bound on the size of simultaneous best response cycles for generic finite two-player games. The bound shows that no cycle will move through the entire strategy space as long as either player has more than two strategies. This bound increases quadratically in the size of the strategy spaces. It is the tightest possible in the sense that we can construct a generic game with a cycle that achieves the bound. JEL classification: C62, C72
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