The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner
نویسندگان
چکیده
Monte Carlo simulation is used to obtain estimates of the probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner for large electorates under the impartial culture condition. While this probability is relatively large for three candidate elections (0.535), it decreases significantly as the number of candidates increases. The same general observations are made when considering the probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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تاریخ انتشار 1999