Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies
نویسندگان
چکیده
A probabilistic voting model with voter utility functions that are not necessarily concave is examined. When voters are polarized, there is a convexity threshold of their utility function below which policy convergence is a unique equilibrium, and above which policy divergence is a unique equilibrium. Divergent equilibrium is more likely when voters become more polarized. Social welfare is maximized in each divergent equilibrium, but not necessarily in every convergent equilibrium. When there is more than one policy issue, the candidates’ equilibrium policies diverge on issues for which utility functions are convex and converge on issues for which they are concave.
منابع مشابه
Correlation neglect, voting behaviour and polarization
We analyse a voting model when voters have correlation neglect, that is, they sometimes fail to appreciate that new information might be correlated with old information. We show that compared with rational voters, a society composed of voters with correlation neglect is more likely to vote for the correct outcome, if the distribution of preferences in society is heterogeneous and suffi ciently ...
متن کاملProbabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral Competition
The pioneering model of electoral competition was developed by Harold Hotelling and Anthony Downs. The model developed by Hotelling and Downs and many subsequent models in the literature about electoral competition have assumed that candidates embody policies and, if a voter is not indifferent between the policies embodied by two candidates, then the voter’s choices are fully determined by his ...
متن کاملCentre De Referència En Economia Analítica Barcelona Economics Working Paper Series Working Paper Nº 34 Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention Barcelona Economics Wp N
Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved “almost in tandem for the past half century” (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect ...
متن کاملPolitical competition between differentiated candidates
We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidates’ characteristics and policies. Candidates’ immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) are exogenously differentiated, while candidates can choose any policy for the remaining issues to maximize their winning probability. Voters have general pr...
متن کاملDo candidates serve parties interests? Party polarization as a discipline device
In this paper we model the interaction between parties and candidates to highlight the mechanisms by which parties selecting candidates may discipline legislators. Parties are long-lived organizations providing incentives to short-lived candidates. The incentive problem parties face is very similar to the problem faced by firms that try to motivate workers. However parties are different from fi...
متن کامل