Comment on "Trees and extensive forms" [J. Econ. Theory 143 (1) (2008) 216-250]
نویسندگان
چکیده
We correct the formulation of one of the properties in [C AI6s-Ferrer, K. Ritzberger, Trees and extensive forms, 1. Econ. Theory 143 (1) (2008) 216-250]. The correction concerns property (EDP.iii') in Section 6.2 (p. 239) and affects results in that final section only. This propcrty, which determines when an Extensive Decision Problem (EDP) is called an Extensive Form (EF), is misstated in the paper. The correct formulation is as follows:
منابع مشابه
A comment on "School choice: An experimental study" [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 146 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011