How Do Voters Retrospectively Evaluate Wasteful Government Spending? Evidence from Individual-Level Disaster Relief

Why do voters often reward incumbents when they receive government spending? We develop a model in which distributive spending provides voters not just with a financial benefit, but also an opportunity to observe and judge the appropriateness of government decisions. Empirically, we test the model’s predictions using individuallevel data on FEMA disaster relief matched to voter turnout records, precinct-level election returns, and geographic data on hurricane severity. In accordance with the model, voters in areas experiencing severe hurricane conditions respond to the receipt of FEMA disaster aid with significantly higher turnout and electoral support for the incumbent administration. In contrast, voters show little response to aid in areas that experienced little damage and that audits identified as having received undeserved FEMA spending. Politicians thus appear to be constrained in their ability to use distributive spending to win elections since voters account for the merit of the aid they receive.