Non-reciprocal altruism in dictator games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We carry out a double blind dictator game experiment where the anonymous recipients are randomly drawn from the Swedish general population, and any donations are mailed to the recipients. About a third of the subjects donate some money. 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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تاریخ انتشار 2000