Fertility Decline and Policy Development in Japan

Japan’s TFR in 2004 was 1.29, which is “lowest-low” fertility, i.e. having a TFR of 1.3 or less. It seems to be impossible for cohorts born after 1960 to achieve the complete fertility of their predecessors. The delay in childbearing was accelerated again after 2000. It was shown that both nuptiality and marital fertility contributed to the recent fertility decline. For marital fertility, it was supposed that coital frequency and infecundity were primary factors, though data were not available. Demands for spouse and children are not declining rapidly and are not at lowest-low level. Thus, recent fertility decline should be explained not from demand itself but from obstacles to fulfill the demand. Firstly, the increase in the direct cost of children is attributable to growing human investments in the education and health of children. Secondly, the economic recession hindered young people’s economic independence and propensity to marry. Married couples were also psychologically depressed from the bad economy and avoided having children. Finally, under the low compatibility between wife’s work and childrearing in Japan, the growth in female labor force participation had a significant negative impact on fertility. The Japanese government has been adopting pronatal measures since the early 1990s but has not succeeded in preventing fertility decline Measures applied by the central government include expansion of child allowance, introduction of childcare leave, improvement in childcare services, etc. However, pronatal measures are not as effective as expected. Quantitative analyses show that it is very difficult to elevate the TFR by 0.1 with policy interventions. There is no reason to expect that policy intervention can induce sustainable recovery of fertility. A cultural deterministic view on fertility asserts that most of the differences between moderately low and lowest-low (or very low) fertility are attributed to direct effects of cultural features, not to governmental efforts. It should be seen that lowest-low fertility is a natural response to socioeconomic changes in the postmaterial period. In this perspective, Western and Northern Europe and English-speaking countries that have avoided lowest-low fertility should be seen as exceptional and requiring explanation. These countries share such cultural features as weak family ties, traditional high position of women, early independence of children, and high prevalence of cohabitation and extramarital births. While these characteristics successfully prevented fertility from falling to lowest-low level, Southern and Eastern European countries and Eastern Asian countries could not resist the socio-economic changes that lead fertility to the lowest-low level. The Japanese Journal of Population, Vol.4, No.1 (March 2006)