Evolutionary Stability Against Multiple Mutations

نویسندگان

  • Anirban Ghatak
  • K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao
  • A. J. Shaiju
چکیده

It is known (see e.g. Weibull (1995)) that ESS is not robust against multiple mutations. In this article, we introduce robustness against multiple mutations and study some equivalent formulations and consequences.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Dynamic Games and Applications

دوره 2  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2012